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AFFORDABILITY DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
ABSTRACT 
 Department of Defense (DOD) senior leaders are chartered to make decisions on 
proceeding or canceling programs based on cost data. Affordability is one of the biggest 
reasons for the DOD to cancel programs. When making affordability decisions, DOD 
leaders weigh the life cycle costs from research and development, technology maturation, 
system testing, procurement and operations, and support. The authors developed an 
affordability decision model to be used to make affordability decisions for Acquisition 




The model was applied to two affordable programs the High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) to verify it. Based on the results, the authors recommended 
that changes be made to the model, in order to increase the accuracy of the model. After 
updating the model the authors applied the model to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 
(JLTV) program. The model was  within 5% of the JLTV program objective unit cost. 
However, the authors concluded that the model cannot be used by itself to make a 
proceed or cancel decision but to support the decision. 
 
• What are the primary elements to address in an affordability decision model for a 
“proceed or cancel” decision? 
• Are there any external parameters that need to be considered prior to using the 
affordability decision model? 
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Affordability is the backbone of Department of Defense (DOD) program success, 
which was reiterated by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, on January 19, 2018, 
when commenting on the National Defense Strategy.  Mattis stated, “To keep pace with 
our times, the department will transition to a culture of performance and affordability that 
operates at the speed of relevance” (2018, para 50). Prior to programs beginning 
development or production, and depending on the acquisition milestone phase, an 
affordability analysis is required for approval by the milestone decision authority (MDA) 
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2015). Many times, however, as programs move through 
the acquisition life cycle, program costs can increase and decrease for a number of reasons. 
As a result of these changes, programs are reviewed by senior leaders and decisions are 
made, based on the affordability of the program, to either proceed with the program or 
cancel it. In an effort to make better informed decisions in the future, this project will 
provide an affordability decision model for acquisition category (ACAT) I programs based 
on the analysis of prior defense programs.  
Our research was based upon the historical cost data of the High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-
Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). The historical cost data that we looked at includes research, 
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement (unit cost, initial spares and 
support equipment) and operation and sustainment (O&S) (Military Personnel, Military 
Construction (MILCON), repair parts and fuel usage). We used the historical cost data and 
our own experience to develop the cost inputs for the model. This model is for senior 
leaders/MDAs to use when making proceed or cancel decisions in the future for ACAT I 
vehicle programs. The model accounts for wartime and surge requirements as well as 
acquisition outcomes. After developing the model, we verified it by using data from the 
HWMMV and M-ATV programs. Any issues in the model we noted and provided 
recommendations for if the model should be changed in the future for use on other ACAT 
I vehicle programs specifically the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program.  
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A. BACKGROUND  
Affordability analyses are required for all DOD ACAT-level programs and are 
required to be updated as programs prepare for all milestone decisions. According to the 
DOD “Affordability analyses are not intended to produce rigid, long-range plans; their 
purpose is to inform current decisions about the reasonableness of embarking on long-term 
capital investments at specific capability levels” (2015, p. 20). The overall goal of the 
analysis is to avoid starting or continuing programs that cannot be produced or be supported 
within a reasonable expectation of future budgets. The affordability analysis is based off 
of the life cycle cost estimate (LCCE), which consists of RDT&E costs, investment costs, 
O&S costs, and disposal costs over the entire life cycle. Table 1 provides the definition of 
ACAT I programs (DOD, 2015, p. 47).  
Table 1. ACAT Description  
ACAT Reason for ACAT Designation Decision Authority 
ACAT I  
• MDAP (10 U.S.C. 2430 (Reference (g))) 
• Dollar value for all increments of the 
program: estimated by the DAE to 
require an eventual total expenditure for 
research, development, and test and 
evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $480 
million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 constant 
dollars or, for procurement, of more 
than $2.79 billion in FY 2014 constant 
dollars 
• MDA designation 
• MDA designation as special interest1 
ACAT ID: DAE or as 
delegated 
ACAT IC: Head of the DOD 
Component or, if delegated, 
the CAE (not further 
delegable) 
 
MDAs use the information in the affordability analysis to determine if programs 
should proceed or be canceled; therefore, the information has to be as accurate as possible. 
Oftentimes these decisions are made without the total affordability of the program leading 
to incorrect decisions being made. The purpose of this project is to develop an affordability 
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decision model to be used by MDAs when making affordability decisions for future 
programs.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
ACAT I programs proceed or are terminated based on affordability, assuming that 
information is accurate. Without accurate information, programs that may be affordable 
could be canceled and those programs that were viewed as affordable may result in severe 
cost overruns in the future. As programs become more complex and larger in value, the 
DOD has to do a better job accurately estimating future program costs. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research objective of this project is to develop an affordability model, based on 
historical cost data and our own experience that can be used by MDAs in the future on 
ACAT I vehicle programs. The goal is to avoid starting or continuing programs that 
cannot be produced or supported within the reasonable expectation of future budgets.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
• What are the primary elements to address in an affordability decision 
model for a “proceed or cancel” decision?  
2. Secondary Research Question 
• Are there any external parameters that need to be considered prior to using 
the affordability decision model?  
E. PURPOSE/BENEFIT 
The purpose of the project is to provide a model that can be used by MDAs to make 
a “proceed or cancel” decision for ACAT I vehicle programs. The model will be based 
upon the review of historical cost data for the HMMWV and M-ATV programs, which will 
include the life cycle cost in relation to the acquisition approach, type for system, and how 
long the system will be utilized by the warfighter. With this model, MDAs will be able to 
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review the facts that are presented in a program’s affordability analysis to make, proceed 
or cancel decisions with higher confidence in their decision. 
F. SCOPE  
For this project, we chose to review the cost data associated with the HMMWV and 
M-ATV programs to develop an affordability model that can be used for future ACAT I 
vehicle program decisions specifically the JLTV. We chose these programs because of 
their similar mission requirements. The M-ATV was the replacement for the HMMWV in 
Iraq and Afghanistan due to the HMMWVs limited off-road capabilities and lack of armor 
protection. Whereas the JLTV is the new permanent replacement for the HMMWV moving 
forward which provides greater survivability. It also meets the airlift capability of the CH-
47F helicopter and meets the air assault mission requirements with the B-kit armor 
removed. Due to the commonality of these programs the historical cost data of the 
HMMWV and M-ATV programs provides an account of the cost elements required for an 
affordability decision model that is then extended and applied to an affordability 
determination for the JLTV program.  
By developing an affordability model based on historical cost data for the 
predecessors of the JLTV this model can be used to make better affordability decisions for 
the JLTV program in the future. The model is first used with cost data from the HWMMV 
and M-ATV programs. The model results will then be analyzed to show the effects of the 
elements of the model and its impact if used on other programs specifically the JLTV 
program.  
G. METHODOLOGY 
For the model, we developed a list of cost elements based on a review of the 
HMMWV and M-ATV cost data and personal experience. The cost data included RDT&E, 
Procurement, O&S historical cost data along with other unique factors. The unique factors 
such as urgency, accelerated schedules, and surges to support wartime activities were 
assessed on a program basis. The model was developed with a series of cost inputs that are 
common across all programs such as shipping, fielding and sustainment. In addition to the 
common cost inputs, the model also has program-specific cost elements such as RDT&E, 
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additional testing and vehicle costs. After completing the model, we then ran the model for 
both the HMMWV and M-ATV programs to verify it. We then compared the results of the 
model against the actual costs for both programs to determine if the model was accurate in 
capturing program costs. Once we reviewed the model against the cost data, we determined 
if changes to the model were required in order for the model to be used on future ACAT I 
vehicle programs to include the JLTV. We compared each line of the model to the 
corresponding actual cost data to determine if the cost was estimated accurately or if a 
change was required.  
Table 2 shows the model and its cost elements, the fields highlighted in green are 
those that are to be filled in for each program. The table is color coded by funding type. 
Red is for RDT&E cost elements. Blue is for procurement cost elements. Orange is for 
O&S cost elements. We developed the model based on our experience and from the 
HMMWV and M-ATV cost data. Chapter IV provides a detailed explanation of the model 
and its specific inputs.  
6 





Years of Support 
(If applicable)
Total Total Cost Comments 
Initial RDT&E 0 $500,000,000 0 $0 $0
Initial RDT&E unit cost based on 
program requirements.
Does the current requirement require additional 
testing than the current system? (Each Additional 
KPP)
0 $50,000 0 $0 $0
How many additional test required
Are there additional testing for survivablity 
requirements (Qty X test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Are there additional reliablity requirements (Qty X 
test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Are there additional enhancements required by 
the user (KSA) (Qty X test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Are there additional performances test required 
(Qty X test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Is there any other RDT&E needed after initial 
testing
0 $1,000,000 0 $0 $0
Is there any additional RDT&E 
funding needed
Is the unit cost greater than the current system 
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost) (Yes or No) Yes # of 
systems and answer next question, No use # of 
systems
0 $0 0 $0 $0 Plug in number specific to system.
Is the unit cost greater than the current system 
(Yes)
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost)
0 $0 0 $0 $0 Plug in number specific to system.
Is the QTY greater than the current system 
(Cost Current System)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
QTY greater
Is the QTY greater than the current system
(Cost of current and additional cost)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
QTY greater
How many fieldings are required (CONUS) 0 $25,000 0 $0 $0 Estimated number of fielding's
How many fieldings are required (OCONUS) 0 $50,000 0 $0 $0 Estimated number of fielding's
Is there new support equipment required 0 $20,000 0 $0 $0 New Support Euipment
Are new special tools required (1:25) 0 $10,000 0 $0 $0 1:25 ratio
Is there spare parts packages required (1:25) 0 $250,000 0 $0 $0 1:25 ratio
Does DLA need to be primed for initial spares on 
the shelf
0 $20,000,000 0 $0 $0
Does DLA require funding
Is there transporation requirements for shipping 
vehicles from the OEM
0 $10,000 0 $0 $0
Number of shipments CONUS
Will additional transporation be required for the 
system (OCONUS)
0 $10,000 0 $0 $0
Number of shipments OCONUS
Are there technical manuals required (ETM) 0 $5,000,000 0 $0 $0 Does the system require an ETM
Are there technical manuals required (IETM) 0 $10,000,000 0 $0 $0 Does the system require an IETM
Is there a new Military Occupational Series (MOS) 
Required 
(Additional Operator or Maintainer)
0 $150,000 0 $0 $0 Does the system need new 
operators or maintainers
Will there be Contract Logistics Support (CLS) 
(CONUS)
0 $150,000 0 $0 $0
Does the system require contract 
Field Service Representatives 
CONUS and for how long
Will there be Contract Logistics Support (CLS) 
(OCONUS)
0 $360,000 0 $0 $0
Does the system require contract 
Field Service Representatives 
OCONUS and for how long
Is there any new construction needed to support 
the new system
0 $1,000,000 0 $0 $0
Does the system require new 
facilities
Will there be sustainment cost for facilities 
(# of Fielding Sites)
0 $10,000 0 $0 $0
Is there any additional funding 
required for sustainment of new 
facillites
Estimated OPTEMPO increase from the current 
system (10% as a baseline or known number) times 
average cost times number of years
0 $5,000 0 $0 $0
Will the system see an increase of 
OPTEMPO use and how many 
vehicles
Total Procurement Cost
Average of Vehicle Cost




1 Test (1%) 2 Tests (2%) 3 Tests (3%)  > 4 Tests (5%) Cost Benefit
Survivability and Enhanceability (Is the CB 
comparable to the enhancement and survivability of 
the system) or
Enhance ability (Can it be upgraded and does the cost 
benefit the upgrade)
Procurement 
Cost Times 10% 
of fleet
10% of fleet 
procurement 
cost times 1% 
Cost Benefit
10% of fleet 
procurement 
cost times 2% 
Cost Benefit
10% of fleet 
procurement cost 
times 3% Cost 
Benefit
10% of fleet 
procurement cost 
times 5% Cost 
Benefit
Is the additional testing a cost 
benefit or not







>  4  Tests (>90%)
> 4 Years
Cost Benefit
Reliability and Maintainability (RAM) and Performance 
(Does the CB correlate to readiness, better 
performance or being maintainable and reliable)
> 90%
Is the additional testing a cost 
benefit or not
Possible reduction in O&S cost from additional testing that can be a cost benefit
Total
Average Cost Per System
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H. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides an introduction to the project. In Chapter II we provide a 
background of the programs used in the project. Chapter III is a literature review of the 
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) model for the affordability of Defense Acquisition 
Programs. In Chapter IV we discuss the data compiled in support of this project. Chapter 






















Affordability became a key focus of DOD programs as a result of DOD Directive 
5000.01. The directive specifically related affordability to overall program cost and 
program stability. It stated that “all participants in the acquisition system shall recognize 
the reality of fiscal constraints. They shall view cost as an independent variable, and the 
DOD Components shall plan programs based on realistic projections of the dollars and 
manpower likely to be available in future years” (Department of Defense [DOD], 2003, p. 
5). Following the 2007 update, Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics (USD[ATL]),  introduced a series of initiatives called Better 
Buying Power (BBP) 1.0. Carter’s BBP Memo 1.0 talked about affordability, as it stated 
“restore affordability to our programs and activates” (2010, p.1). Based on these directives, 
affordability became a requirement of DOD programs via the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS). Affordability determinations are made by senior 
leaders based upon the results of the affordability analysis and the LCCE prepared for 
programs. As stated earlier, an affordability determination is required at milestones A and 
B.  
However, this was not the first time that program affordability has been brought to 
the forefront of DOD acquisition. Two members of Congress, Senator Sam Nunn and 
Representative David McCurdy, introduced the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which was signed 
into law by President Ronald Regan in 1982 (Schwartz, 2010). The act did not specifically 
use the term “affordability,” but the act was intended to control cost growth. The act was 
in response to a number of ACAT I Programs that had recently experienced significant cost 
overruns. 
The act requires that programs report to Congress when they exceed certain cost 
growth increases. The thought at the time of the act was that having to publicly state that a 
program had excessive cost growth would increase the desire for the DOD to control costs 
on their own. These cost growth increases are called breaches and there are two types 
significant and critical.  
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A “significant” breach is when the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (the total 
cost of development, procurement, and construction divided by the number 
of units procured) or the Procurement Unit Cost (the total procurement cost 
divided by the number of units to be procured) increases 15% or more over 
the current baseline estimate or 30% or more over the original baseline 
estimate. A “critical” breach occurs when the program acquisition or the 
procurement unit cost increases 25% or more over the current baseline 
estimate or 50% or more over the original baseline estimate (Schwartz, 
2010, p. 2).        
Originally, the critical and significant breaches only applied to the most recent 
baseline estimate. In 2006, Congress also applied cost growth thresholds to the original 
baseline estimate to prevent programs from simply being re-baselined in order to prevent 
having to report a breach. In an effort to further entice the DOD to control costs, Congress 
added a requirement in 2009 that any program that reports a critical breach is to be 
considered terminated unless the Secretary of Defense approves the program to continue 
(Schwartz, 2010). 
More recently, program affordability has been brought to the forefront of DOD 
acquisition through the BBP initiatives. At the direction of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
Robert Gates, in June 2010, (USD(ATL)) Carter issued a memo to the DOD acquisition 
community about BBP. In his memo, Carter spoke of the increased DOD budgets that had 
been ongoing since 11 September 2001 and that the DOD has to start implementing 
changes moving forward to control costs, to improve the way it does business especially 
as budgets were starting to be reduced. As this was Carter’s first time speaking to the DOD 
about this he provided two high level points for this initiative. Below is a portion of his 
memo stating the two high level points: 
First, the savings we are seeking will not be found overnight. It has taken 
years for excessive costs and unproductive overhead to creep into our 
business processes, and it will take years to work them out. We will be 
concentrating on new contracts as they are awarded in coming years, to 
ensure that they reflect new efficiencies. Some of the targets and objectives 
we decide to pursue will only be able to be achieved on a timeline of several 
years. On the other hand, Secretary Gates has explained clearly why we 




Second, we in the Department cannot succeed at this task alone. We need 
the input and involvement of industry, and I will be actively seeking their 
support and ideas. We do not have an arsenal system in the United States: 
the Department does not make most of our weapons or provide many non-
governmental services essential to warfighting—these are provided by 
private industry. Our industry partners are patriots as well as businessmen. 
This initiative should contribute to the continuing vitality and financial 
viability of the defense industry in the era ahead by aligning the direction 
and incentives of the Department and industry. It is intended to enhance and 
incentivize efficiency and total factor productivity. Most of the rest of the 
economy exhibits productivity growth, meaning that every year the buyer 
gets more for the same amount of money. So it should be in the defense 
economy. Increased productivity is good for both industry and government. 
So also is avoiding budget turbulence and getting more programs into stable 
production. 
We also need the help of Congress. Members of Congress observe with 
dismay as they are asked to approve ever-increasing funding for the very 
same product or service. We will need their input and support to make 
necessary adjustments that will in some cases be difficult. (Carter, 2010a, 
p.2)      
In addition to the high-level guidance, Carter also provided a list of objectives; one 
of which was to “restore affordability to our programs and activities” (p. 1). This was the 
first time since the Nunn-McCurdy Act that program affordability was brought to the 
forefront of DOD acquisition programs. In September 2010 Carter provided additional 
guidance and direction for DOD regarding BBP. This memo again stressed affordability as 
the memo contained a section called Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth with a 
subheading of Mandate affordability as a requirement: 
Affordability means conducting a program at a cost constrained by the 
maximum resources the Department can allocate for that capability. Many 
of our programs flunk this basic test from their inception. Specifically, at 
Milestone A, my Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) approving 
formal commencement of the program will contain an affordability target 
to be treated by the program manager (PM) like a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) such as speed, power, or data rate- i.e., a design parameter 
not to be sacrificed or compromised without my specific authority. At 
Milestone B, when a system’s detailed design is begun, I will require 
presentation of a systems engineering tradeoff analysis showing how cost 
varies as the major design parameters and time to complete are varied. This 
analysis would allow decisions to be made about how the system could be 
made less expensive without loss of important capability. This analysis 
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would then form the basis of the ‘Affordability Requirement’ that would be 
part of the ADM decision. I will be issuing a directive in the near future to 
implement this guidance that will apply to both elements of a program’s life 
cycle cost - the acquisition cost (typically 30 percent) and the operating and 
support cost (typically 70 percent). For smaller programs, the CAEs will be 
directed to do the same at their level of approval. I recognize that we need 
to improve the Department’s capability to perform this kind of engineering 
tradeoff analysis, but the ability to understand and control future costs from 
a program’s inception is critical to achieving affordability requirements. 
(Carter, 2010b, p. 2)       
Based on Carter’s guidance, affordability not only is required to be discussed at 
each major milestone decisions but must also be considered as a KPP. With affordability 
now being treated as a KPP, PMs not only had to start understanding program affordability 
but also tracking it throughout the life cycle of the program as KPPs have to be met. This 
was a change in how affordability was viewed in the DOD previously.  
Through the implementation of BBP, like with any type of implementation, there 
were lessons learned and refinements that took place. In order to refine and improve BBP, 
BBP 2.0 was issued in 2012 by Frank Kendall, the then-USD (AT&L). BBP 2.0 is made 
up of 36 initiatives that are organized into seven key areas. However, as Kendall stated 
“the basic goal of BBP, however, remains unchanged: deliver better value to the taxpayer” 
(p. 1).       
As with the original BBP, BBP 2.0 reiterated the importance of affordability as it 
was still one of the key areas called Achieve Affordable Programs. His BPP 2.0 Memo 
stated three main points to Achieve Affordable Programs, which, are listed as follows:  
• Mandate affordability as a requirement 
• Institute a system of investment planning to derive affordability caps 
• Enforce affordability caps (Kendall, 2012, p.2) 
The most recent iteration, BBP 3.0, was released in April 2015 by Kendall. This 
iteration focused more on increasing and maintaining our technological advantage over our 
adversaries. However, it still had affordability as one of the key areas stating the “continued 
needs to set and enforce affordability caps” (Kendall, 2015, p. 2). Between BBP 2.0 and 
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3.0 the DOD Instruction (DoDI) I 5000.02 was updated to include policy requirements for 
affordability caps. As a result of this inclusion, affordability is now required to be reviewed 
at all milestone decisions (DOD, 2015).  
Affordability has been a concern in DOD acquisition since 1982 with the Nunn-
McCurdy Act and through all the BBP Initiatives. With the Nunn-McCurdy Act 
incorporated into the United States Code and the affordability requirements incorporated 
into Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5000.01 and DoDI 5000.02, both Congress 
and DOD leadership have implemented affordability requirements that clearly display the 
overall importance of this topic. Since Congress appropriates funding and DOD leadership 
is responsible for the execution/spending of the appropriated funds, both understand that 
programs can no longer be fixed by simply throwing more money at the problem. They 
also understand the importance of obtaining the best value for the government and being 
good stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars, especially in non-conflict times. With this 
understanding of affordability and how it is related to DOD programs, we collected actual 
cost data on the HMMWV and M-ATV programs.  
We used information to develop our affordability decision model from the 
HMMWV and M-ATV programs. The next few pages provide background on both of these 
programs. For both programs, a high-level program background is provided along with 
information on program costs and vehicle quantities to show the size of the programs. In 
addition, the evolution of the Army going from the HMMWV to the M-ATV and finally 
to JLTV is described.  
According to the Olive-Drab, the HMMWV was a replacement for the M-151 Jeep 
and the light-duty trucks produced by General Motors and Dodge. The first HMMWV 
contract was awarded to AM General in 1983. This five-year contract had an estimated 
value of $1.2 billion, which allowed the government to procure up to 55,000 vehicles in 15 
different configurations. 1983 was the biggest multi-year contract awarded for light tactical 
trucks in history. Due to the higher demand for HMMWVs the Army ordered an additional 
15,000 as an option increasing the total value of the contract from $1.2B to $1.6B (Olive 
Drab, 2011).     
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The HMMWV has had multiple iterations and upgrades since 1983. Total 
production, which is scheduled to conclude in fiscal year (FY) 2020, is estimated to be 
approximately 240,000 by AM General. Approximately 133,000 remaining HMMWVs are 
for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and to be issued as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The 
existing HMMWV fleet will remain in the Army inventory system and will be gradually 
phased out through attrition with the replacement of the JLTV (Olive Drab, 2011).      
The M-ATV was the last MRAP variant that was an urgent requirement in support 
of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The M-ATV was a joint Service program 
with the Army designated as the Primary Inventory Contract Activity (PICA). The PICA 
is “the single manager responsible for cataloging, procuring, disposing and identifying 
depot-level maintenance assignment. A PICA serves as the principal supply control activity 
responsible for establishing stockage objectives, controlling stockage objectives and 
maintaining item accountability for an item of supply; formerly called the wholesale 
inventory manager” (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.). However, each Service had its 
own requirements for the M-ATV to meet its mission needs. The HMMWV’s up armor 
and the off road capability were limited which created a capabilities gap in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Due to the increased weight of the HMMWV and less powerful powertrain, 
there was a critical need to fill the capabilities gap that the HMMWV could not meet to 
meet the urgency of the fight in Afghanistan. The M-ATV had the same type of 
independent suspension system as the HMMWV’s but its increased ground clearance made 
it more effective off road.  
In addition to the increased ground clearance, the M-ATV had increased power to 
accommodate the heavier duty suspension system to support up to 37,000 pounds (Army 
Project Office Mine Resistant Ambush Protected [APO MRAP] Operations Cell, 
PowerPoint slides, July 10, 2012). These capabilities met the Afghanistan off-road 
requirements for protected ground mobility, improved explosive device (IED) protection 
and small arms fire. Additional survivability upgrades consisted of explosively formed 
penetrator (EFP) armor kits to defeat EFP threats and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) 
netting to defeat RPGs.   
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In November 2008, Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, for up 
to 10,000 M-ATVs, were awarded to five original equipment manufacturers (OEM). Each 
OEM was awarded a delivery order for three M-ATVs, meeting the IDIQ minimum 
quantity requirement, which were used for testing. In June 2009 the Oshkosh Defense, LLC 
(Oshkosh) M-ATV, one of the five OEMs, was awarded production deliver orders as they 
were determined to be the best value for the government and ended in October 2012. A 
total of 8,722 M-ATVs were delivered to the United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, 
Air Force and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) (T. Miller personal communication 
March 19, 2019). During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army conducted an MRAP 
study and in August 2014 decided on 5,651 M-ATVs as their enduring fleet (APO MRAP 
Operations Cell, PowerPoint slides, July 10, 2012).        
The M-ATV was an interim solution to the HMMWV due to the operating 
environment and the requirement for a more survivable vehicle. The M-ATV is still being 
used in overseas contingency operations due to threat environments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
The JLTV is planned to be used as the HMMWV replacement and it is a joint 
Service lead program with the Army as the PICA like the M-ATV. Each Service has its 
own requirements for the JLTV to meet their mission needs. In August 2015, a firm fixed 
price option year contract for an estimated 17,000 JLTVs was valued at $6.7B and awarded 
to Oshkosh Defense. 
The primary mission of the JLTV is to provide protected, sustained and 
networked light tactical mobility to the Joint forces capable of worldwide 
deployment across the full spectrum of military operations and mission 
profiles under all weather and terrain conditions. It will provide mobility to 
reconnaissance units and sustain direct fire in support of combat maneuver 
with substantial payload for personnel, equipment and supplies. The JLTV 
will support command, control and communication in both stationary and 
on-the-move modes, enabling interoperability with Joint and coalition 
forces in decentralized operations over extended ranges in complex and 
dynamic operational environments (T. Miller, personal communication, 
March 12, 2018).  
Figure 1 compares the quantities reported for the HMMWV and M-ATV in the 
current Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS) (T. Miller, personal 
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communication, July 19, 2018). The comparison shows the total quantity of HMMWVs to 
M-ATVs reported from FY11 to FY17. From FY11–FY15 HMMWV quantities continued 
to decrease due to the drawdown operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and units in the United 
States not using the vehicles. However, in FY16-FY17 the HMMWV quantities increased. 
The M-ATV quantities also declined through FY13 and then began increasing in FY14. 
After FY14, the M-ATV quantities remained somewhat consistent where the HMMWV 
numbers increased dramatically.  
During this reporting period, the government did not dispose of vehicles and then 
buy new ones, as the figure may seem to indicate. The reasons for the decline and increase 
in quantities were due to vehicles being retrograded from Iraq and Afghanistan and being 
sent to the depots for RESET during FY13-FY14. In addition, during this time the Army 
switched accountability systems. The Army wholesale side switched from Property Book 
Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) to Defense Property Accountability System (DPAS) and 
the Army retail side switched from Standard Army Maintenance System-Enhanced 
(SAMS-E) to Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A). It was not until FY16  
when the new databases began reporting actual quantities that the quantities began to 
increase. The quantities continued to be updated after this, as there was a lag in reporting. 
This lag was due to retrograde vehicles not being accounted for as they were in transit or 
vehicles were being double counted. Vehicles could have been double counted with the 
same vehicle being counted by an individual unit and then as Army’s Preposition Stock 





The JLTV program office is estimating a little over 16,000 JLTVs to be procured 
from FY16 to FY22 and the overall Army’s Acquisition Objective (AAO) will be about 
55,000 vehicles. The Services decide what variant they require each year the program 
office executes this with the OEM. Due to the complexity of the systems and different 
configurations, the OEM must ensure the supply base is on contract to meet their 
production schedule to the Army. The Figure 2below outlines the number of JLTVs to be 
procured each year and a total number by the end of each FY. JLTV procurements will be 




FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
HMMWV Quantity 96,456 91,096 80,304 73,740 70,104 80,298 111,582























FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22
JLTV Procurements 686 1,828 2,110 2,881 3,067 2,656 2,877












III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As stated earlier, in 2010 the DOD rolled out the BBP initiative to correct many 
well-documented problems with defense acquisition management. Affordability was the 
focus of the initiative, and the USD (AT&L) asked the Institute for Defense Analyses 
(IDA) to conduct a study that would help inform decisions by DOD acquisition executives 
regarding affordability. The IDA study, called the Affordability of Defense Acquisition 
Programs, provided a detailed insight of Service budgets and captured not just the Army, 
but all Services. The study stated the following on affordability:  
Affordability cannot be effectively addressed by the Defense and 
Component Acquisition Executives in the acquisition milestone review 
processes alone—it must also be addressed within the context of the overall 
DOD fiscal and force programs (i.e., the Program Review phase of the DOD 
planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS)). In the absence of 
that context, DOD acquisition executives cannot make well-informed 
decisions about affordability at acquisition milestone reviews (Porter et al., 
2015). 
In addition, the study stated that even though certain programs may be needed 
shortly afterwards, the DOD’s long-term planning does not account for programs that are 
not listed in the Future Year Defense Program (FYPD). As reported in AcqNotes, “the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) (10 USC § 221) summarizes forces, resources and 
equipment associated with all DOD programs. The FYDP displays total DOD resources 
and force structure information for 6 years; current 2 budgeted years and 4 additional years” 
(AcqNotes, 2018). In addition, the study explained that the DOD also needs to do a better 
job of estimating future costs primarily relating to procurement and O&S. The study did 
not provide a specific model on improving the estimating for overall program costs to 
support affordability decisions. However, they did make reference to their “Port 
Optimization” (PortOpt) model, “This model estimates the likely procurement costs of 
MDAPs under alternative production schedules, and optimizes those schedules 
simultaneously for multiple programs” (Porter et al., 2015).  
The PortOpt model is based on projections, as opposed to from similar past 
programs. The inputs are described, but the actual model is not provided in the paper. There 
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are different ways to perform analysis to provide recommendations to leadership for 
decisions. It may not always be the information they are used to; however, it gives them 
points to weigh when a decision is needed. There are two great advantages of the PortOpt 
model. First, it can optimize multiple programs and roll them up for each Service. Second, 
it can be used to “reduce peaks in the annual procurement funding required by a portfolio 
of programs by rescheduling production when production rates become efficient” (Porter 
et al, 2015). 
One of the bullet points in the paper stated that the “O&S costs for acquisition 
programs are more difficult to estimate with accuracy than investment costs because of the 
unknown in new acquisition programs” (Porter et al., 2015). That is a true statement 
especially for procurement, where there are multiple new subsystems being integrated into 
one complete system. The OEM should have a projected cost based on mean times of repair 
and repair costs of subsystems. The OEM should also be able to provide actual reliability 
and sustainability (R&S) cost by either running reliability testing with system components 
or they could estimate by using modeling and simulations (M&S) tests.  
PMs are chartered to ensure that what the Army needs fits within their budgets and 
meets the capabilities defined by the user. If the PMs are replacing current systems due to 
obsolescence, end of life, or because a new capability is needed, they can use previous 
system cost data when available. They can compare with the highest cost driver known by 
O&S cost systems to help make decisions if the new systems will be affordable or not. The 
IDA model did focus on O&S cost but tended to break out the Military Personal and 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost separately. These costs are combined when 
conducting O&S cost data mining. 
Our research investigated the O&S costs of two systems, which is different from 
the IDA study. For our project, we continued to address affordability at the program level. 
The IDA study recommended that affordability should be determined at the component 
level covering multiple programs. However, after reading the IDA study it helped frame 
the thinking for what different data should be researched and to develop inputs to help 
frame the output of our model. There were two recommendations from the study that 
helped frame the thinking of our research for RDT&E and Procurement cost: “Research 
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and further analysis should be done to develop better methods to determine and isolate 
O&S cost elements for system design, reliability, and survivability testing and support 
strategy concepts” and “O&S cost estimates should support acquisition milestone reviews 
and be examined with the same as investment costs” (Porter et al., 2015).  
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The data inputs researched for the development of this model consisted of RDT&E, 
Procurement, and O&S costs for both the HMWWV and M-ATV. In addition to reviewing 
the costs inputs, we also used standard cost estimating inputs for programs to develop the 
model. The model applies different inputs for the number of testing events to support the 
following: KPPs, Key System Attributes (KSAs), survivability requirements (if 
applicable), cost and quantity of vehicles, number of fielding sites both Continental United 
States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS), support 
equipment, special tools and test equipment, spare packages, technical documentation, 
transportation costs, new military occupation series (MOS), field service representatives 
(FSR) for contractor logistics support (CLS), new construction of facilities and operational 
tempo (OPTEMPO).  
The model contains a series of cost inputs that are common across all programs 
such as shipping, fielding and sustainment. In addition to the common cost inputs, the 
model also has program specific cost elements such as RDT&E, additional testing and 
vehicle costs. Each input provides a cost, which is accumulated throughout the model to 
determine a total cost for the program. We built the model in Microsoft Excel, which allows 
the model to be very easy to use and simple to adjust as required by individual programs. 
All fields that require costs or quantities to be inputted into the model are highlighted in 
green.  
Table 3 has the model’s cost inputs for initial RDT&E, additional testing, 
survivability, reliability, other KSAs and performance enhancements. For the initial 
RDT&E event unit cost, this is program specific. This input will come from the program’s 
initial cost estimate. The unit cost for current requirement requires additional testing than 
the current system is fixed is for any new requirement that was not on the prior system. For 
example, if the M-ATV had additional requirements over the HMMWV these requirements 
would be captures here for additional test costs. If this is a new requirement that is not 
replacing a current system the quantity would remain at zero, as the testing costs would be 
captured in the initial RDT&E. 
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Additional tests related to survivability, reliability, enhancements and performance 
will only have quantities entered if the system is replacing a current system; otherwise, the 
costs for these tests will be included in the original cost test cost estimate. If the system is 
replacing a current system, then these are calculated in addition to the overall additional 
testing. For example, if you have five additional requirements to test, you could input that 
in the additional testing row, then if two of the five were for survivability, you would put 
a two in the additional survivability row. The additional survivability row would then be 
calculated by taking the quantity of two, which would then be multiplied by the individual 
testing cost of $50,000 and then taking 25% of that total. Therefore, for this example, the 
total survivability test cost would equal $25,000 ((2X$50,000) X 0.25). If initial testing is 
complete and new testing is required, the event unit cost is fixed at $1,000,000.  







Total Total Cost Comments  
Initial RDT&E 0 $0  0 $0  $0  
Initial RDT&E 
unit cost based on 
program 
requirements. 
Does the current requirement 
require additional testing than 
the current system? (Each 
Additional KPP) 




Are there additional testing for 
survivability requirements (Qty 
X test X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  
25% of each 
additional testing 
requirement 
Are there additional reliability 
requirements (Qty X test X 
25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  
25% of each 
additional testing 
requirement 
Are there additional 
enhancements required by the 
user (KSA) (Qty X test X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  
25% of each 
additional testing 
requirement 
Are there additional 
performances test required (Qty 
X test X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  
25% of each 
additional testing 
requirement 
Is there any other RDT&E 
needed after initial testing 
0 $1,000,000  0 $0  $0  





Table 4 represents the quantity of systems being procured and the event unit cost, 
which is the average unit price. Both of these inputs are program specific.  
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Total Total Cost Comments  
Is the unit cost greater than the 
current system  
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost) 
(Yes or No) Yes # of systems 
and answer next question, No 
use # of systems 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  
Plug in number 
specific to 
system. 
Is the unit cost greater than the 
current system (Yes) 
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost) 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  
Plug in number 
specific to 
system. 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system  
(Cost Current System) 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  QTY greater 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system 
(Cost of current and additional 
cost) 
0 $0  0 $0  $0  QTY greater 
 
Table 5 represents the number of fieldings and support equipment needed to 
deprocessed, train and transfer the systems to the warfighter. For this portion of the model, 
all of the event unit costs are fixed. Depending on the program, you will fill in the number 
of CONUS and OCONUS fieldings and the quantity of new support equipment required 
per each fielding location. Per the DOD 7000.14-R Financial Management Regulation 
Volume 9, CONUS is defined as “the 48 contiguous states of the United States and the 
District of Columbia” (Department of Defense [DOD], 2019) and OCONUS is “the area 
outside of the 48 states of the United States and the District of Columbia.” (DOD, 2019). 
For special tools which are “designed to perform a specific task for use on a specific end 
item or a specific component of an end item and is not available in the common tool load 
that supports that end item/unit” (Department of the Army, 2018), one quantity is sufficient 
to cover 25 vehicles at each fielding location. This also applies to spare part packages, 
where one quantity is sufficient to cover 25 vehicles at each fielding location.  
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Total Total Cost Comments  
How many fieldlings are 
required (CONUS) 
0 $25,000  0 $0  $0  
Estimated number 
of fieldings 
How many fieldlings are 
required (OCONUS) 
0 $50,000  0 $0  $0  
Estimated number 
of fieldings 
Is there new support equipment 
required 
0 $20,000  0 $0  $0  
New Support 
Equipment 
Are new special tools required 
(1:25) 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $0  1:25 ratio 
Are there spare parts packages 
required (1:25) 
0 $250,000  0 $0  $0  1:25 ratio 
 
Table 6 represents the costs of support for development of technical manuals and 
support costs after the initial fieldings. For this portion of the model, all of the event unit 
costs are fixed, and depending on the program, you will fill in the required quantities. For 
the first row about Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) spares, if your requirement is new, 
you will input a quantity of one for this section as only one initial spare purchase by DLA 
is required. This initial spares purchase is to guarantee that when a unit makes a requisition, 
there will be supplies in the supply system to provide the unit. If this is not done, DLA will 
not procure the initial spares to support the requirement. DLA will not do this until they 
receive requisitions from the field, which will cause initial parts shortages and reduce unit 
readiness. For transportation requirements from the OEM, the quantity input will be the 
total amount of end items that will be shipped by the government to a CONUS location. 
For those end items that require OCONUS shipment, this quantity will be entered into the 
next row. However, all end items that require OCONUS shipment also need to be included 
in the CONUS shipment quantity, as these units need to be shipped to the OCONUS 
shipping location. For example, if there are 1,000 end items and 500 have to be shipped 
OCONUS you will put in a quantity of 1,000 for CONUS shipment and 500 for OCONUS 
shipment. The fourth and fifth rows are for manuals to support the system.  
The fourth row is for electronic technical manuals (ETMs), which has a fixed unit 
cost. ETMs are required for all systems that need Military Standard (MIL-STD) manuals 
as the commercial manuals, if applicable, are not sufficient to sustain the system 
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organically. Organic support is when the Army uses organic forces to sustain the system 
without the help of contractor support. According to an Army, article “Organic forces are 
those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its 
table of organization” (Redfern et al., 2018, para. 10). The fifth row is for interactive 
technical manuals (IETMs) and this is a fixed unit cost. Depending on the program 
requirements if MIL-STD manuals are required, only one of these two will have an 
associated quantity. IETMs are more detailed and interactive, as the name states, as 
opposed to ETMs, which are simply electronic versions of paper manual. The next row is 
for if a new MOS is required to operate and maintain the new system. This would occur if 
the Army currently does not have a MOS that is trained to operate and maintain this type 
of system. The quantity associated with this would apply to the quantity of total new MOSs 
required to support the system at each fielding location. If you have 10 fielding locations 
and need four operators and one maintainer, you would enter a total quantity of five into 
this row.  
The next two rows are for CLS either CONUS or OCONUS. CLS is required when 
the system is being fielded and it cannot be organically supported. This could be caused by 
two things: one the fielding location does not have the appropriate MOS maintain the 
system, or the more common reason, that maintenance manuals being developed have not 
been approved for release for organic support. For both rows, the quantities will be based 
upon the quantity of fielding locations, and the quantity of personnel at each location along 
with the years of support required. If you have three OCONUS fielding locations that 
require two FSRs at each location for one year the quantity would be six, and the years 
would be one.  
The row for new construction equipment needed to support the new system is used 
if your system requires new facilities to be built to maintain the system at the fielding 
location. Therefore, the quantity will be based upon the total quantity of fielding locations. 
The next row is the sustainment costs associated with each new facility being built. These 
two rows will have the same quantity input. The last row for an increase in the OPTEMPO. 
If the new system replacing an existing one requires a higher OPTEMPO, meaning 
increased use, there will be an increase in maintenance costs for the fielding locations. The 
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quantity for this row is based on the fielding locations that will now have increased 
OPTEMPO; this may not apply to all fielding locations. If this is a new system, the quantity 
in this field will be zero.  







Total Total Cost Comments  
Does DLA need to be primed 
for initial spares on the shelf 
0 $20,000,000  0 $0  $0  
Does DLA require 
funding 
Is there transportation 
requirements for shipping 
vehicles from the OEM 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $0  
Number of shipments 
CONUS 
Will additional transportation 
be required for the system 
(OCONUS) 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $0  
Number of shipments 
OCONUS 
Are there technical manuals 
required (ETM) 
0 $5,000,000  0 $0  $0  
Does the system require 
an ETM 
Are there technical manuals 
required (IETM) 
0 $10,000,000  0 $0  $0  
Does the system require 
an IETM 
Is there a new Military 
Occupational Series (MOS) 
Required  
(Additional Operator or 
Maintainer) 
0 $150,000  0 $0  $0  
Does the system need 
new operators or 
maintainers 
Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(CONUS) 
0 $150,000  0 $0  $0  
Does the system require 
contract Field Service 
Representatives CONUS 
and for how long 
Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(OCONUS) 
0 $360,000  0 $0  $0  
Does the system require 
contract Field Service 
Representatives 
OCONUS and for how 
long 
Is there any new construction 
needed to support the new 
system 
0 $1,000,000  0 $0  $0  
Does the system require 
new facilities 
Will there be sustainment 
cost for facilities  
(# of Fielding Sites) 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $0  
Is there any additional 
funding required for 
sustainment of new 
facilities 
Will the OPTEMP increase 
from the current system 
(10% as a baseline) (QTY of 
systems effected) 
0 $5,000  0 $0  $0  
Will the system see an 
increase of OPTEMPO 





Table 7 captures total and average cost of the system. The average costs are derived 
by taking the total costs of the system and dividing it by the total quantity of systems being 
procured. This portion of the module requires no inputs, as the prior portions of the model 
feed into this for the outputs.  
Table 7. Total and Average Cost of the Systems 
Total Total Procurement Cost 
Average Cost Per System Average of Vehicle Cost 
 
Other considerations when inputting cost data into the model are to evaluate the 
survivability and the readiness of a system by conducting additional testing during 
development. Additional survivability testing can provide a cost avoidance by determining 
that a system can be repaired, as opposed to being replaced during wartime operations. 
Conducting additional survivability testing can determine if the system can be repaired at 
a lower cost than that of complete replacement. It can be used for enhancement testing as 
well to determine if newer technologies can be applied to the system now instead of 
incorporating these changes later, which usually costs considerably more 
Additional reliability testing can provide long-term benefits to a system, as it can 
help to determine ways to reduce future O&S costs for repairs, cost avoidance, and repair 
times. The overall operational readiness of the system can be increased by reducing O&S 
costs for repairs and repair times. While the Army’s goal is to maintain above a 90% 
readiness rate for all of their systems, historically, its systems fall below this rate.  
The reason that systems fall below the Army’s readiness rate goal is that as systems 
become older, parts become obsolete and increase in unreliability. In order to maintain the 
systems due to these issues, O&S costs tend to increase. PMs try to prevent this from 
happening however, but funding for modernization and maintenance is hard to obtain as a 
system becomes older. Working together with Engineering and Logistics during test can 
help with the maintainability of the system. By influencing, the system design to make 
30 
repairs quicker, this will reduce down time of the systems and increase the systems 
readiness rate.  
When applying additional testing for each section, it can provide assumptions to 
the PM and a metric to be measured after the system is developed and fielded. Table 8 can 
be used to determine the potential cost avoidance to a system by performing additional 
survivability and reliability testing. As this table provides the potential cost avoidance in 
the future by performing additional testing, it will not be used to reduce the overall cost of 
the system, but instead, as a data point for determining the amount of survivability and 
readability testing that should be done. 
Table 8. Additional Survivability and Reliability Testing Cost Avoidance  
 
 We applied the model to both the HMWWV and M-ATV to to determine 
afforability and to determine if the model was successful in collecting all of the costs 
associated with estimating a programs total cost. The program fillins for the HMWWV 
were derived from HMWWV costs summaries, which were provided by Cost and Systems 
Cost and Operational Readiness from Additional Testing 






1 Test (1%) 2 Tests (2%) 3 Tests (3%) 




Enhance ability (Is the 
CB comparable to the 
enhancement and 
survivability of the 
system) or 
Enhance ability (Can it 
be upgraded and does 




10% of fleet 





10% of fleet 
procurement 
cost times 2% 
Cost Benefit 
10% of fleet 
procurement 
cost times 3% 
Cost Benefit 




















3 Tests (>90%) 
> 3 Years 
>  4  Tests 
(>90%) 




and Performance (Does 
the CB correlate to 
readiness, better 
performance or being 
maintainable and 
reliable) 







Analysis Office at U.S. Army Tank Automotive and Armorments Command (TACOM) in 
November 2019 (E. Murphy, personal communication, November, 25, 2019). The fillins 
for the M-ATV were from the historical files working on the M-ATV program, Capability 
Production Document for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family of Vehicles 
(FoV) Version 1.1 (T. Miller, personal communication, July 7, 2009)  and the MRAP – All 
Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) Life cycle Cost Estimate (T. Miller personal communication 
March 19, 2019). In Chapter V the results from the two models will be analyzed.  
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Three scenarios were ran using the cost model were for the HMMWV, the M-ATV 
and the JLTV. Actual historical data for the HMMWV and M-ATV were based on the 
inputs from the capabilities development documents (CPDs) and budget lines for both 
programs quantities of vehicles and unit costs for production were used to produce an 
estimated total and average cost of the systems. JLTV numbers were based on initial budget 
and the selected acquisition report dated 2017 (T. Miller, personal communication, July 8, 
2018). The HMMWV had numerous production years and quantities from 1983 – 2018, 
M-ATV production was from 2009 – 2011 and JLTV started production in 2016 and are 
currently being produced. Tables 9 through 13 are for the HMMWV, Tables 14 through 19 
are for the M-ATV and Table 20 for the JLTV.  
A. HMMWV MODEL ANALYSIS 
For the RDT&E costs in Table 9, the initial RDT&E was a plug in number. For all 
other potential RDT&E program costs there was no additional RDT&E information 


















Total Total Cost Comments  











Does the current 
requirement require 
additional testing than the 
current system? (Each 
Additional KPP) 




Are there additional 
testing for survivability 
requirements (Qty X test 
X 25%) 




Are there additional 
reliability requirements 
(Qty X test X 25%) 




Are there additional 
enhancements required by 
the user (KSA) (Qty X test 
X 25%) 




Are there additional 
performances test required 
(Qty X test X 25%) 




Is there any other RDT&E 
needed after initial testing 





Table 10 captures the procurement quantities and associated unit costs. Due to 
multiple years of various HMMWV procurements for this model, we focused on the three 
major production contracts in 1983, 1989 and 2000 for quantity and cost information. The 
model was designed to put in the multiple production years and averaging would not 
provide true cost comparison to actual numbers. As you can see from the information below 
the first HMMWV procured in 1983 had an average unit cost of $22,822 and in 2000 the 












Total Total Cost Comments  
Is the unit cost greater than 
the current system  
(Qty of Systems X Unit 
Cost) (Yes or No) Yes # of 
systems and answer next 
question, No use # of 
systems 
70,105 $22,822  0 $1,599,936,310  $1,731,936,310  
1983 
Procurement 
Is the unit cost greater than 
the current system (Yes) 
(Qty of Systems X Unit 
Cost) 
49,798 $32,129  0 $1,599,959,942  $3,331,896,252  
1989 
Procurement 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system  
(Cost Current System) 
0 $22,822  0 $0  $3,331,896,252  N/A 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system 
(Cost of current and 
additional cost) 




In Table 11 for HMMWV fieldings and support package costs the assumption was 
to account for the number of fieldings required based on two thirds of the production 
quantity being fielded CONUS and one third being fielded OCONUS. After the total 
quantity of fieldings were broken out by CONUS and OCONUS the quantities were then 
reduced by a 25 to 1 ratio as we assumed that 25 vehicles were fielded at each location. 
The HMMWV did not require and new support equipment. Special tools and initial parts 
packages were required when the HMMWVs were fielded and these were procured on 1 
to 25 basis. Based on each unit receiving initial spares there was no need for DLA to being 
procuring spares at the time of fielding. One thing to note is what when the HMMWV was 
fielded DLA did not exist. For transportation costs, we based this on the two-thirds CONUS 
one third OCONUS as we did with the fieldings. The HMMWV was fielded with paper 
technical manuals however, as technology evolved ETMs were developed and are now the 
standard manual for the HMMWV.  
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Total Total Cost Comments  
How many fieldlings 
are required (CONUS) 
6,276 $25,000  0 $156,900,000  $17,888,750,022  
2/3 of total 
production QTY 
with a 1:25 
Ratio.  
How many fieldlings 
are required 
(OCONUS) 
3,138 $50,000  0 $156,900,000  $18,045,650,022  
1/3 of total 
production QTY 
with a 1:25 
Ratio. 
Is there new support 
equipment required 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $18,045,650,022  N/A 
Are new special tools 
required (1:25) 
9,414 $10,000  0 $94,140,000  $18,139,790,022  1:25 Ratio 
Are there spare parts 
packages required 
(1:25) 
9,414 $250,000  0 $2,353,500,000  $20,493,290,022  1:25 Ratio 
Does DLA need to be 
primed for initial spares 
on the shelf 
0 $0  0 $0  $20,493,290,022  
DLA was not 
primed for the 
HMMWV 
Is there transportation 
requirements for 
shipping vehicles from 
the OEM 
235,352 $10,000  0 $2,353,520,000  $22,846,810,022  




required for the system 
(OCONUS) 
78,451 $10,000  0 $784,510,000  $23,631,320,022  
1/3 of total 
production QTY 
Are there technical 
manuals required 
(ETM) 
1 $5,000,000  0 $5,000,000  $23,636,320,022  Page Based TMs 
Are there technical 
manuals required 
(IETM) 
0 $10,000,000  0 $0  $23,636,320,022  N/A 
 
There was only one input to the Table 12 below. There were no additional costs for 
new MOS to operator or maintain the vehicles nor facilities. As the HMMWV was, the 
replacement for the Jeep and light duty trucks the MOSs and facilities were already in place 
to operate and support it. The HMMWV was organically maintained when fielded and as 
a result, there was not a requirement for CLS. The one input to the section of the model 
was OPTEMPO, which was due to vehicles operating in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to the 
MRAP Vehicles being fielded in 2007. Based on the model the cost associated with an 
increase in OPTEMPO is $5,000 per vehicle however, during our research we were able to 
find the actual costs of the OPTEMPO, which averaged $3,915 per vehicle (T. Miller, 
personal communication, July 8, 2018). This average was based upon repair parts and spare 
parts usage. Based on the actual cost data we can see that model is overstating the total 
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OPTEMPO cost by approximately $127,678,460. In order to prevent this, we are 
recommend changing the model to making this a program specific plug in number.  







Total Total Cost Comments  
Is there a new Military 
Occupational Series (MOS) 
Required  
(Additional Operator or 
Maintainer) 






Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(CONUS) 
0 $150,000  0 $0  $23,636,320,022  N/A 
Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(OCONUS) 
0 $360,000  0 $0  $23,636,320,022  N/A 
Is there any new construction 
needed to support the new 
system 
0 $1,000,000  0 $0  $23,636,320,022  N/A 
Will there be sustainment cost 
for facilities  
(# of Fielding Sites) 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $23,636,320,022  N/A 
Estimated OPTEMPO 
increase from the current 
system (10% as a baseline or 
known number) times average 
cost times number of years 
23,535 $5,000  5 $588,380,000  $24,224,700,022  
OPTEMPO 
FY06 – FY10 
 
Total cost for the HMMWV program from the model was a $24,224,700,022 with 
an average cost per system of $102,851 as shown in Table 13. If the cost model had 
accurately estimated the costs, the HMMWV total cost would have been $24,097,021,562 
with an average cost per system of $102,309 (E. Murphy, personal communication, 
November, 25, 2019).  
Table 13. HMMWV Total and Average Cost 
Total $24,244,700,022  
Quantity of HMMWVs Procured  235,352 
Average Cost Per System $102,851 
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The HMMWV did not have any historical information on additional testing so there 
was no data to determine if there would have been a cost avoidance by performing 
additional survivability and reliability testing.  
B. M-ATV MODEL ANALYSIS   
Like the HMMWV the M-ATV RDT&E, cost was a plug in number from the 
MRAP FoV V1.1 CPD (T. Miller, personal communication, July 7, 2009). These costs 
were combined with initial development and testing of the system from 2009 through 2012. 
Initial development testing of prototype samples determined that a multiple award contract 
would be awarded to five contractors. After the multiple award contracts were awarded 
additional testing determined that Oshkosh Defense provided the best value to the 
government and was chosen to provide production M-ATVs. There was additional testing 
on the M-ATV and it went through years of survivability testing to increase the vehicles 
survivability in order to meet the ever-changing IED threat in Afghanistan. The MRAP 
program office through additional testing came up with a long-term solution of an 
Underbody Improvement Kit, which reduced replacement cost of procuring new vehicles, 
and made the M-ATV one of the safest vehicles on the battlefield against IEDs. Because 



















Total Total Cost Comments  
Initial RDT&E 1 $398,000,000  0 $398,000,000  $398,000,000  
Initial RDT&E unit 
cost based on 
program CPD. 
Does the current 
requirement require 
additional testing than the 
current system? (Each 
Additional KPP) 
0 $50,000  0 $0  $398,000,000  Part of base testing 
Are there additional testing 
for survivability 
requirements (Qty X test X 
25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $398,000,000  Part of base testing 
Are there additional 
reliability requirements 
(Qty X test X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $398,000,000  Part of base testing 
Are there additional 
enhancements required by 
the user (KSA) (Qty X test 
X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $398,000,000  Part of base testing 
Are there additional 
performances test required 
(Qty X test X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $398,000,000  None 
Is there any other RDT&E 
needed after initial testing 






The procurement quantities and the units funded cost in Table 15 were from 
historical program documents while working on the M-ATV program. There was an initial 
buy of 8,083 M-ATVs from June 2009 through December 2010 and a follow on contract 
for an additional 639 built with the underbody improvement kit (UIK) which ended in 
October 2012 bringing the total number of M-ATVs produced to 8,722. As the original 
production, number of 8,083 was converted to add the UIK the additional cost of this was 
reflected in the cost model. At the time, there were no other vehicles to compare prices 
against to determine if there was a delta between the two variants to either add or subtract 
the delta. Unlike the HMMWV, the M-ATV numbers and dollars were inputted into the 
model without any issues due to the known number of vehicles and contract award price 
for the production of the vehicles and the installation of the UIK. As you can see from the 
information below the cost of an M-ATV was approximately 484% more than the last 
production contract average price of the HMMWV. 
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Total Total Cost Comments  
Is the unit cost greater than the 
current system  
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost) 
(Yes or No) Yes # of systems 
and answer next question, No 
use # of systems 
8,083 $459,395  0 $3,713,289,785  $4,112,289,785  
Plug in number 
specific to system. 
Is the unit cost greater than the 
current system (Yes) 
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost) 
8,083 $131,679  0 $1,064,361,357  $5,176,651,142  
J&A for UIK 
upgrade 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system  
(Cost Current System) 
0 $459,395  0 $0  $5,176,651,142  N/A 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system 
(Cost of current and additional 
cost) 
639 $591,074  0 $377,696,286  $5,554,347,428  
Additional 
requirement to bring 
the total to 8,722 
 
Inputs for Table 16 were put in the model based on program data obtained while 
working on the M-ATV program and having to manage the logistics budget for the 
fieldings and sustainment of the systems. There was a low number of fieldings CONUS as 
they were only used for home station training prior to units deploying as 90% of the assets 
were shipped directly OCONUS. Because of 90% of the vehicles, being shipped OCONUS 
this also attributed to increased shipping costs. There was no additional support equipment 
needed for the M-ATV and all support equipment was already in Iraq and Afghanistan 
from previous MRAP fieldings. There were special tool kits procured in support of the M-
ATV to perform maintenance on the systems and were based on a 1:25 vehicle ratio.  
Due to lessons learned from previous MRAP fieldings and the long lead times of 
getting parts procured through DLA the program office created robust initial parts packages 
with an average cost of $2,478,517 for 1:25 ratio. This is approximately 10 times the initial 
spare parts package price in the model. Using the model cost the total cost of the M-ATV 
program would have been underestimated by approximately $548,000,000. As the M-ATV 
is a more up to date program, we recommend changing the model to make the amount for 
initial spare parts a program specific fill-in and not a set cost. When increasing this amount 
considerations have to be made for the environment that the system is going into. For 
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instance if the model is used during peacetime the requirement for spare parts would be 
assumed to be less than during wartime.  
In addition to this, the program office also requested that DLA provide 
$300,000,000 in spare parts to ensure parts were on the shelf when the warfighter needed 
them. This along with the initial spares needs to be revised based on the system 
environment as the DLA spare parts requirement for the M-ATV was 15 times the model 
cost ($20,000,000) for this requirement. The warfighter benefited with the repair parts 
packages available and DLA had parts on the shelf the M-ATV never dropped below a 
90% operational readiness the whole time while conducting missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The $10,000 initial transportation cost were based on first destination 
shipping of all vehicles CONUS another $10,000 for second destination shipping theater. 
The last requirement was an IETM for the vehicle and estimated cost of new IETM 
development is around $10,000,000. 
When looking at the two unit price issues with the model, initial spares and DLA 
initial spares, the model is under estimating the program by approximately $828,000,000, 


















Total Total Cost Comments 
How many fieldings are 
required (CONUS) 
26 $25,000  0 $650,000  $5,554,997,428  
636 for HST CONUS 
APS, 1:25 Ratio 
How many fieldings are 
required (OCONUS) 
323 $50,000  0 $16,150,000  $5,571,147,428  
8,086 for OEF, OIF and 
APS; 1:25 Ratio  
Is there new support 
equipment required 
0 $20,000  0 $0  $5,571,147,428  N/A 
Are new special tools 
required (1:25) 
349 $10,000  0 $3,490,000  $5,574,637,428  Ratio 1:25  
Are there spare parts 
packages required (1:25) 
349 $250,000  0 $87,250,000  $5,661,887,428  Ratio 1:25 
Does DLA need to be 
primed for initial spares 
on the shelf 
1 $20,000,000  0 $20,000,000  $5,681,887,428  
Initial Class IX 
procurement 
Is there transportation 
requirements for shipping 
vehicles from the OEM 
8,722 $10,000  0 $87,220,000  $5,769,107,428  
All vehicles were shipped 
from the OEM to 
SPAWAR 
Will additional 
transportation be required 
for the system 
(OCONUS) 
8,086 $10,000  0 $80,860,000  $5,849,967,428  
Movement to OIF, OEF 
and APS 5 (Kuwait) 
Are there technical 
manuals required (ETM) 
0 $5,000,000  0 $0  $5,849,967,428  N/A 
Are there technical 
manuals required (IETM) 
1 $10,000,000  0 $10,000,000  $5,859,967,428  ITEM Requirement 
 
For Table 17 the M-ATV did not require additional personnel to operate or conduct 
maintenance on the vehicles. However, due to the rapid acquisition of the systems and 
urgent requirement the M-ATV was originally support using Oshkosh Defense’s 
commercial manual. As the commercial manuals were not sufficient, enough for organic 
maintenance support three years of CLS was required to for maintenance. The other input 
to the section of the model was the OPTEMPO of the systems, which was for 7,500 vehicles 
over five years. As with HMMWV, we were able to obtain the actual OPTEMPO costs for 
the M-ATV, which had an average of $9,403.77 per vehicle (T. Miller, personal 
communication, July 8, 2018). The actual cost of the OPTEMPO was almost double the 
amount used in the model. Due to this the model is understating the total OPTEMPO cost 
by $165,112,500 and based on this we recommend making the OPTEMPO cost a program 
specific plug in number.  
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Total Total Cost Comments  
Is there a new Military 
Occupational Series (MOS) 
Required  
(Additional Operator or 
Maintainer) 
0 $150,000  0 $0  $5,859,967,428  
No additional MOS 
required (91B) 
Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(CONUS) 
39 $150,000  3 $17,550,000  $5,877,517,428  3 year FSR Support 
Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(OCONUS) 
284 $360,000  3 $306,720,000  $6,184,237,428  3 year FSR Support 
Is there any new construction 
needed to support the new 
system 
0 $1,000,000  0 $0  $6,184,237,428  N/A 
Will there be sustainment cost 
for facilities  
(# of Fielding Sites) 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $6,184,237,428  N/A 
Will the OPTEMP increase 
from the current system (10% 
as a baseline or known 
number) times average cost 
times number of years 
7,500 $5,000  5 $187,500,000  $6,371,737,428  
7,500 fielded to OEF 
and OIF, 
OPTEMPO FY10 - 
FY15 
 
As shown in Table 18 the M-ATV program total cost from the model is 
$7,338,715,110 with an average vehicle cost of $841,403. These numbers seem high 
however, the M-ATV mission was to conduct off road operations and save warfighters 
lives. If the cost model had accurately estimated the costs, the M-ATV total cost would 
have been $8,331,827,610 with an average cost per system of $949,821 (T. Miller, personal 
communication, July 8, 2018).  
Table 18. M-ATV Total Cost 
Total $7,338,715,110  
Quantity of M-ATVs procured  8,722 
Average Cost Per System $841,403 
 
Due to the combat operations and the threat of the enemy decisions were made to 
proceed with the selection of the most survivable vehicle to protect the warfighter. Even 
though cost was not a deciding factor in the selection of the M-ATV it was proven to be 
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extremely reliable since being fielding in 2009 and extremely survivable on the 
battlefield against IEDs. Due to the wartime conditions, the M-ATV program office had 
all the funding needed for testing to ensure the M-ATVs were reliable and survivable for 
the warfighter.  
Some of the primary elements that the M-ATV program office needed was to 
decide how much testing was required to make the vehicle more survivable and test 
additional reliability attributes of the vehicles at the same time. As the vehicle design 
changed due to the different threats to the warfighters additional, testing was required to 
prove out the design to include additional armor requirements. The M-ATV proved out 
those tests and the operational readiness has always above 90% due to the design, 
survivability of the vehicle, the robust supply system and properly planning of CLS to 
assist the warfighter in maintaining their vehicles.  
In Table 19, we applied the M-ATV numbers into this section of the model to show 
a cost avoidance with the additional testing that was conducted that proved out the 
survivability and the survivability of the systems. Using the formula for the survivability 
section and vehicle cost by 10% of the fleet the calculations per test showed a cost 
avoidance by repairing the system as opposed to replacing it and in O&S costs. The 
program office conducted more than five additional test for survivability which was 
evaluated at the 5% cost benefit verse the replacement of the systems. The systems have 
been extremely survivable which outweighed the testing cost from being repaired instead 
of being replaced. The $18M cost avoidance in the model was low due to the survivability 
of the M-ATV compared to the events the fleet endured during the first three years in 
Afghanistan. The additional testing for the reliability paid off with the M-ATV continually 
having an operational readiness rate above 90%. However, as we stated earlier these are 







Table 19. M-ATV Cost and Operational Readiness Benefit 
Cost and Operational Readiness Benefit from Additional Testing 
Overall cost benefit 









Enhance ability (Is 
the CB comparable 
to the enhancement 
and survivability of 
the system) or 
Enhance ability 
(Can it be upgraded 
and does the cost 
benefit the upgrade) 
$371,328,979  N/A N/A N/A $18,566,449 Yes 
  
Overall Readiness 
benefit to the system 
Readiness 
1 Test (>90%) 
1 Year 
2 Tests (>90%) 
2 Years 
3 Tests (>90%) 
3 Years 













>90% N/A N/A N/A >5 Test Yes 
 
 Based on the two successful programs that we ran the model against we 
determined that changes needed to be made to the model in order for it to be successful in 
helping determine if a program should proceed or be cancelled. When running the model 
both programs had varied OPTEMPO costs per vehicle. The M-ATV OPTEMPO was 
88% more and the HMMWV was 22% lower than the set cost amount of $5,000. Based 
on the wide range of OPTEMPO cost per vehicle the cost model should be changed to 
make this a program specific plug in number.  
 The other model input that we decided to change was the DLA initial spares 
amount. The set cost amount that we had for the DLA initial spares was $20,000,000. 
However, M-ATV actual cost data for DLA initial spares amount was $300,000,000. This 
is 1500% more than the $20,000,000 fixed cost amount that we had in the model for all 
programs.  
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 Overall, the HMMWV cost was overstated by approximately 1% and the M-ATV 
was understated by approximately 12.9%. Due to these variances by both programs, we 
decided that these inputs into the cost model should be changed to a program specific 
plug in number.   
 However, with the HMMWV model being overstated the model could have been 
left as is as it would have not resulted in cost breach. The same can be said for the M-
ATV model even though it was understated by 12.9% it is still below the breach 
requirements. However, as both of them had differences in one of the two areas we 
believed updating the model moving was required. With these changes, we believe that 
the model is sufficient to use when determining affordability for other ACAT 1 programs 
to include the JLTV program.  
C. MODEL UPDATES  
We updated the model based on recommendations above and applied it to the 
JLTV program which is shown in Table 20 below. We used the baseline of RDT&E cost 
and did not add any additional testing. We used the AAO for the number to be procured 
and the total procurement cost for each system (T. Miller, personal communication, July 
8, 2018). For fieldings, we assumed 75% of the AAO CONUS and 25% OCONUS to 
calculate the quantities. Special tools and initial spares followed the same 1:25 ratio 
distribution to vehicles. For DLA spares, we used $20M to prime the supply system of 
spares with DLA, as this amount is unknown. We added in transportation quantities for 
CONUS shipments based on 75% CONUS and 25% OCONUS. The last input to the 














Total Total Cost Comments  
Initial RDT&E 1 $988,000,000  0 $988,000,000  $988,000,000  
Initial RDT&E 
unit cost based 
on program 
CPD. 
Does the current 
requirement require 
additional testing than the 
current system? 
0 $50,000  0 $0  $988,000,000  N/A 
Are there additional testing 
for Survivability 
requirements (Qty X test X 
25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $988,000,000  N/A 
Are there additional 
reliability requirements 
(Qty X test X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $988,000,000  N/A 
Are there additional 
enhancements required by 
the user (KSA) (Qty X test 
X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $988,000,000  N/A 
Are there additional 
performances test required 
(Qty X test X 25%) 
0 $0  0 $0  $988,000,000  None 
Is there any other RDT&E 
needed after initial testing 
0 $1,000,000  0 $0  $988,000,000  N/A 
Is the unit cost greater than 
the current system  
(Qty of Systems X Unit 
Cost) (Yes or No) Yes # of 
systems and answer next 
question, No use # of 
systems 
55,000 $216,000  0 $11,880,000,000  $12,868,000,000  
Plug in number 
specific to 
system. 
Is the unit cost greater than 
the current system (Yes) 
(Qty of Systems X Unit 
Cost) 
55,000 $199,000  0 $10,945,000,000  $23,813,000,000  
Plug in number 
specific to 
system. 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system (Cost 
current system) 
$0 $0 0 0 $23,813,000,000 N/A 
Is the QTY greater than the 
current system 
(Cost of current and 
additional cost) 
0 $415,000  0 $0  $23,813,000,000  N/A 
How many fieldings are 
required (CONUS) 
1650 $25,000  0 $41,250,000  $23,854,250,000  
75% of the Fleet 
(1:25 Ratio) 
How many fieldings are 
required (OCONUS) 
550 $50,000  0 $27,500,000  $23,881,750,000  
25% of the Fleet 
(1:25 Ratio) 
Is there new support 
equipment required 
0 $20,000  0 $0  $23,881,750,000  N/A 
Are new special tools 
required (1:25) 
2,200 $10,000  0 $22,000,000  $23,903,750,000  Ratio 1:25 
Is there spare parts 
packages required (1:25) 
2,200 $250,000  0 $550,000,000  $24,453,750,000  Ratio 1:25 
Does DLA need to be 
primed for initial spares on 
the shelf 
1 $20,000,000  0 $20,000,000  $24,473,750,000  










Total Total Cost Comments  
Is there transportation 
requirements for shipping 
vehicles from the OEM 




transportation be required 
for the system (OCONUS) 




Are there technical manuals 
required (ETM) 
0 $5,000,000  0 $0  $25,161,250,000  N/A 
Are there technical manuals 
required (IETM) 
1 $10,000,000  0 $10,000,000  $25,171,250,000  
ITEM 
Requirement 
Is there a new Military 
Occupational Series (MOS) 
Required  
(Additional Operator or 
Maintainer) 




Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(CONUS) 
0 $150,000  0 $0  $25,171,250,000  N/A 
Will there be Contract 
Logistics Support (CLS) 
(OCONUS) 
0 $360,000  0 $0  $25,171,250,000  N/A 
Is there any new 
construction needed to 
support the new system 
0 $1,000,000  0 $0  $25,171,250,000  N/A 
Will there be sustainment 
cost for facilities  
(# of Fielding Sites) 
0 $10,000  0 $0  $25,171,250,000  N/A 
Estimated OPTEMPO 
increase from the current 
system (10% as a baseline 
or known number) times 
average cost times number 
of years 
0 $5,000  0 $0  $25,171,250,000  N/A 
 
Based on the JLTV inputs to the model Table 21 below shows the total cost of the 
program, total quantities and average cost per system. The average cost per system in our 
model was within 5% of the JLTV program objective unit cost (E. Murphy, personal 
communication, September 2, 2020).  
Table 21. JLTV Total Cost 
Total $25,171,250,000  
Quantity of JLTVs to be procured  55,000 
Average Cost Per System $457,659 
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We were unable to obtain information whether additional survivability and 
reliability testing for the JLTV was going to occur, therefore we were not able to run the 
cost avoidance portion of the model.  
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Affordability is a key factor when determining if a program should go forward or 
be cancelled. BBP is an initiative to look at program costs to ensure they are affordable. 
Our model was developed to aid in the determination of program affordability, and if 
program should proceed or be cancelled. We developed the model based on our 
experiences in DOD program management, and with cost data that we were able to obtain 
from the HMMWV and M-ATV programs. We used the HMMWV and M-ATVs 
programs, as the M-ATV was the replacement for the HMMWV in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In addition to this, both of these programs were determined to be affordable as they went 
from initial concept to sustainment. Based on this we believed that if we were able to create 
a model that could accurately estimate the total costs of these programs, when compared 
to the actual cost data we had, that the model could be applied to the JLTV and other ACAT 
I vehicle programs. We chose the JLTV as it is planned to be the full replacement of the 
HMMWV.  
While developing the model we were able to answer our primary research question: 
what are the primary elements to address in an affordability decision model for a “proceed 
or cancel” decision? As seen earlier, Table 21 shows the elements that we determined are 
required to support an affordability decision for a program. The table is color coded by 
funding type. Red is for RDT&E cost elements. Blue is for procurement cost elements. 











Years of Support 
(If applicable)
Total Total Cost Comments 
Initial RDT&E 0 $500,000,000 0 $0 $0
Initial RDT&E unit cost based on 
program requirements.
Does the current requirement require additional 
testing than the current system? (Each Additional 
KPP)
0 $50,000 0 $0 $0
How many additional test required
Are there additional testing for survivablity 
requirements (Qty X test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Are there additional reliablity requirements (Qty X 
test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Are there additional enhancements required by 
the user (KSA) (Qty X test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Are there additional performances test required 
(Qty X test X 25%)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
25% of each additional testing 
requirement
Is there any other RDT&E needed after initial 
testing
0 $1,000,000 0 $0 $0
Is there any additional RDT&E 
funding needed
Is the unit cost greater than the current system 
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost) (Yes or No) Yes # of 
systems and answer next question, No use # of 
systems
0 $0 0 $0 $0 Plug in number specific to system.
Is the unit cost greater than the current system 
(Yes)
(Qty of Systems X Unit Cost)
0 $0 0 $0 $0 Plug in number specific to system.
Is the QTY greater than the current system 
(Cost Current System)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
QTY greater
Is the QTY greater than the current system
(Cost of current and additional cost)
0 $0 0 $0 $0
QTY greater
How many fieldings are required (CONUS) 0 $25,000 0 $0 $0 Estimated number of fielding's
How many fieldings are required (OCONUS) 0 $50,000 0 $0 $0 Estimated number of fielding's
Is there new support equipment required 0 $20,000 0 $0 $0 New Support Euipment
Are new special tools required (1:25) 0 $10,000 0 $0 $0 1:25 ratio
Is there spare parts packages required (1:25) 0 $250,000 0 $0 $0 1:25 ratio
Does DLA need to be primed for initial spares on 
the shelf
0 $20,000,000 0 $0 $0
Does DLA require funding
Is there transporation requirements for shipping 
vehicles from the OEM
0 $10,000 0 $0 $0
Number of shipments CONUS
Will additional transporation be required for the 
system (OCONUS)
0 $10,000 0 $0 $0
Number of shipments OCONUS
Are there technical manuals required (ETM) 0 $5,000,000 0 $0 $0 Does the system require an ETM
Are there technical manuals required (IETM) 0 $10,000,000 0 $0 $0 Does the system require an IETM
Is there a new Military Occupational Series (MOS) 
Required 
(Additional Operator or Maintainer)
0 $150,000 0 $0 $0 Does the system need new 
operators or maintainers
Will there be Contract Logistics Support (CLS) 
(CONUS)
0 $150,000 0 $0 $0
Does the system require contract 
Field Service Representatives 
CONUS and for how long
Will there be Contract Logistics Support (CLS) 
(OCONUS)
0 $360,000 0 $0 $0
Does the system require contract 
Field Service Representatives 
OCONUS and for how long
Is there any new construction needed to support 
the new system
0 $1,000,000 0 $0 $0
Does the system require new 
facilities
Will there be sustainment cost for facilities 
(# of Fielding Sites)
0 $10,000 0 $0 $0
Is there any additional funding 
required for sustainment of new 
facillites
Estimated OPTEMPO increase from the current 
system (10% as a baseline or known number) times 
average cost times number of years
0 $5,000 0 $0 $0
Will the system see an increase of 
OPTEMPO use and how many 
vehicles
Total Procurement Cost
Average of Vehicle Cost




1 Test (1%) 2 Tests (2%) 3 Tests (3%)  > 4 Tests (5%) Cost Benefit
Survivability and Enhanceability (Is the CB 
comparable to the enhancement and survivability of 
the system) or
Enhance ability (Can it be upgraded and does the cost 
benefit the upgrade)
Procurement 
Cost Times 10% 
of fleet
10% of fleet 
procurement 
cost times 1% 
Cost Benefit
10% of fleet 
procurement 
cost times 2% 
Cost Benefit
10% of fleet 
procurement cost 
times 3% Cost 
Benefit
10% of fleet 
procurement cost 
times 5% Cost 
Benefit
Is the additional testing a cost 
benefit or not







>  4  Tests (>90%)
> 4 Years
Cost Benefit
Reliability and Maintainability (RAM) and Performance 
(Does the CB correlate to readiness, better 
performance or being maintainable and reliable)
> 90%
Is the additional testing a cost 
benefit or not
Possible reduction in O&S cost from additional testing that can be a cost benefit
Total
Average Cost Per System
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Once we developed the model, we then ran the model for both the HMMWV and 
M-ATV programs. After this, we took the total estimated cost information from both 
models and compared it against the actual program cost information. During this 
comparison, we determined that the model needed to be changed, as we could not verify 
our estimated total costs for both programs. The HMMWV program actual costs were 
lower and the M-ATV higher than what the model estimated. As we stated earlier, as both 
of these programs were determined to be affordable we knew that our model had to be 
changed.  
We changed the model from fixed to program specific plugins for OPTEMPO and 
DLA initial spares. . These changes were because the model overestimated the OPTEMPO 
costs for the HMMWV and underestimated the DLA initial spares cost. If these changes 
had been in our original model the model would have provided a total cost estimate that 
aligned with the actual cost data.  
After we updated the model, we ran the model for the JLTV program. Based on the 
JLTV results, which were within 5% of government estimates, we verified that the changes 
to the model were required (E. Murphy, personal communication, September 2, 2020). To 
date the JLTV program has been determined to be affordable, which indicates that model 
will be useful in making more-informed affordability decisions by the Services. However, 
as the JLTV is a new system, which still has to make its way through the acquisition 
lifecycle there may be instances where affordability will have to be reviewed. In these 
instances, we believe this model can be used help determine if the JLTV remains 
affordable.  
Our secondary research question was whether there are there any external 
parameters that need to be considered prior to using the affordability decision model. With 
running the model three times for three different programs, one in sustainment, one 
entering sustainment and one a new system we were able to determine external parameter 
that should be accounted for prior to using the model. The external parameter that we 
identified is if the program is being developed during a wartime environment. If the 
program is, being used during wartime there will be higher spare part and OPTEMPO costs. 
For spare parts, this is because the vehicles will be in high demand and the requirement for 
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them to be operationally ready will be higher. Therefore, larger quantities of spare parts 
will be required to be procured when the system is being fielded to make sure that there 
are no spare part shortages. With the OPTEMPO if the vehicles are being used during a 
wartime environment the usage of the vehicles will dramatically increase. These external 
factors can be seen in our analysis and our recommendation for them to be program specific 
plug in numbers.  
In addition, to answering our two research questions we also determined that our 
model cannot be used by itself to make a proceed or cancel decision for programs. 
However, the model should be used to support this decision, as there are other factors not 
relating to cost that should be considered as well. One area that we were unable to validate 
in our model was the portion on additional testing. For additional survivability and 
reliability testing and potential cost avoidance, we were unable to validate its benefit as we 
only had information on the M-ATV program. However, when evaluating program 
affordability additional survivability and reliability testing should be discussed and 
evaluated by senior leadership prior to making a proceed or cancel determination on a 
program. In the future, the benefits of additional testing should be researched, as we were 
not able to obtain this information. Many times programs, especially lower priority 
programs, do not have the funding or the time to execute an extensive test program. One 
other area that we would like to look at in the future is if this model could be used for lower 
ACAT vehicle programs.  
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